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REVIEW ESSAY

THE EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT OF POLITICS, LAW AND RELIGION
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OFRELIGIOUS FREEDOM. By Winnifred Fallers Sullivan.

Princeton University Press 2005. Pp. 286. $23.95. ISBN: 0-691-11801-9.
How FREE CAN RELIGION BE? By Randall P. Bezanson. University of

Illinois Press 2006. Pp. 286. $29.95. ISBN: 0-252-03112-1.
WRESTLING WITH GOD: THE COURTS' TORTUOUS TREATMENT OF RELIGION.

By Patrick M. Garry. The Catholic University of America Press 2006. Pp.
230. $49.95. ISBN: 0-8132-1451-1.
MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES.

By Frank S. Ravitch. New York University Press 2007. Pp. 239. $45.00.
ISBN: 0-814-77585-3.
Reviewed by Bryan K. Fair*

Not since the earliest days of the United States, during the time of
James Madison's and Thomas Jefferson's fight for religious liberty in
Virginia, has the intersection of politics, law and religion been so
significant a question of American public policy. During the 2008
campaign, numerous presidential candidates touted their religious
convictions as a core aspect of their appeals to voters. Mike Huckabee,
a preacher turned politician, employed direct overtures to evangelical
believers; Mitt Romney, a Mormon, was asked pointedly how his unique
religion would influence the way he would govern. Barack Obama
rejected the secular model of politics and made extensive appeals to his
own Christian faith in winning the presidency. It appears religious
viewpoints will play an increasing role in the general electorate's
consideration of many of the major political issues of the day, from gay
marriage and school prayer to school vouchers and abortion regulations,
for many years to come.
* Bryan K. Fair is the Thomas E. Skinner Professor of Law at The University of Alabama
School of Law. Tuscaloosa. Alabama.
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Moreover, for at least sixty years both establishment and free
exercise claims have vexed American courts and judges, with the U.S.
Supreme Court remaining sharply divided on the proper interpretation of
the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Likewise, Congress and state legislatures have enacted numerous
religious freedom statutes such as the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act to show
their displeasure with judicial opinions providing too little protection for
the free exercise of religion.
One finds little consensus on the meaning of religious liberty in the
U.S. today. There is no agreement on what constitutes a religious
establishment or when government policies must yield to private
religious practice. Presidents Bush and Obama both invoked God in
major public speeches. Many political leaders have led prayer sessions
Some state legislatures have sponsored
during public meetings.
religious activities, including installing the Ten Commandments or other
religious displays in public buildings or on public grounds. Some
judges have insisted on beginning judicial business with a prayer. Some
school administrators begin each day with the Pledge of Allegiance and
its Congressional "Under God" revision and many school events begin
or end with prayers, invocations and benedictions. It is difficult to
locate any organizing principle within the law of religious liberty.
For years, I have considered myself a champion of religious liberty
because I believe the government should stay out of religious affairs,
that government should not sponsor religious activities, and that all
Americans must have equal status before government, whatever their
views about matters of religious conscience and the supernatural. Said
differently, a government of all the people must respect the diversity of
the nation by never assuming a religious creed and by protecting religion
as a private matter for individual choice.
I have been a frequent critic of American courts and lawmakers for
their enormous efforts to accommodate religious exercises in the public
arena. I have insisted that government stay out, but the Court has often
insisted that the government must participate to protect religious liberty.
My answer has been that when the government protects private religious
activities it follows the constitutional command, violating neither
religion clause. For me, the only times that government violates the
Constitution is when it sponsors religious activities or when it interferes
with private religious beliefs, without a compelling justification for
doing so. Yet, the Court and lawmakers have not seen the issues in such
stark and simple terms, leaving in their wake a constitutional quagmire.
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Readers seeking a broader understanding of the tension between
religious liberty and American law will benefit enormously from these
four important books from leading religion and constitutional law
scholars and theorists. Behind titles like The Impossibility of Religious
Freedom, How Free Can Religion Be, Wrestling with God, and Masters

of Illusion, the authors have laid bare perhaps the most divisive issue of
our time.
In The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, Winnifred Sullivan has

written an enormously interesting book about a long-running legal
proceeding in Florida to explain why religious freedom in America is
impossible. (8) Her book concerns the struggle of some Boca Raton
residents to bury their dead consistent with their religious traditions and
restrictive municipal ordinances that prohibited some of their grave site
displays, which included statues, crosses, or raised monuments. (32-53)
Because Sullivan was a consultant for the plaintiffs' lawyers and an
expert witness at the trial, she provides a window on the conflict
between religious liberty, on the one hand, and the application of secular
laws through our courts, on the other. She is a keen, sensitive observer,
concerned fundamentally about the failure of lawyers and judges to
listen to claimants and their experts. She appears stunned that a judge or
a lawyer might harass a claimant seeking to advance a free exercise of
religion interest. (90-94)
Sullivan's book portrays the compelling claims of a dozen families
who buried family members in a city-owned cemetery. Each family
claimed that as part of their free exercise of religion, they had installed
statues, headstones or religious symbols at the grave site of their loved
ones. The City, however, had enacted a rule requiring that all grave
markings be level with the ground. (32-52) Sullivan's writing takes the
reader into the cemetery, into the lives of the survivors who sought to
express their religious norms, and into the federal court that had to
determine if the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")
prevented the City from enforcing its grave site regulations.
Sullivan's thesis is that religious liberty is impossible because
secular laws in the United States and other parts of the world define
what religion is too narrowly, because courts have no business deciding
what counts as religion and what doesn't count, and because government
should not declare what is or is not a substantial burden on religious
exercise since when it does so it constrains religious exercise. (29-31)
Sullivan explains how the federal judge and the City's lawyers rejected
the plaintiffs' claim that how they chose to bury their dead was part of
Instead, the government
their free exercise of religion. (88-98)
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described the grave markings as matters of personal preference with no
significant protection under Florida law.
Sullivan illustrates how the government imposed a burden of
justification on the families to prove that the grave markings were
central to their religious faith. (107-09) And despite extensive expert
testimony, including Sullivan's, suggesting a religious basis for the
grave markings, the plaintiffs lost.
Sullivan's critique is important. Despite state and federal statutes,
courts still interpret them and decide under what circumstances a
religion claim is important enough to gamer judicial protection. For
plaintiffs, judicial standards are elusive and incoherent. Said another
way, Sullivan writes, "legally encompassing the religious ways of
people in an intensely pluralist society is most likely impossible." (138)
Sullivan's examination of the judicial process is only one important
aspect her book. The most important contribution is her discussion of
the problems of how law defines religion and through its definition
impedes religious liberty. (138-59) In Sullivan's view, this is the nub of
the problem. (138-48) In the twenty-first century, the meaning and
understanding of religion is individual, personal and decentralized.
Thus, the court and the City's lawyer framed the question improperly.
Rather than asking if a particular faith required a certain style of grave
markings, the court should have listened to the plaintiffs who said over
and over that their religious upbringings and traditions compelled them
to install certain grave markings. (159)
Sullivan's work is also remarkable because she is an expert on
religion, holding a Ph.D in religion from the University of Chicago. She
has also taught religious studies at leading American universities. With
her exceptional background, Sullivan re-centers religious practice within
the debate over the meaning of religious liberty. Readers will find the
final part of the book especially engaging as Sullivan explains the
difference between legal religion and free religion. (138-59) Sullivan's
conclusion will also surprise many readers. She suggests that the free
exercise clause and state RFRA provisions will not ensure religious
liberty so long as courts define religion so narrowly. She would look
elsewhere, perhaps to the equality guarantee that has expanded
protection for other minorities, to secure religious liberty. (148-59)
Professor Randall Bezanson's How Free Can Religion Be is

another highly commendable read, especially for Supreme Court
watchers. While Professor Sullivan focused on one case to tell her story
about the limits of religious liberty, Bezanson deconstructs eight
landmark cases: Reynolds, Everson, Yoder, Epperson, Engel, Smith,
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Rosenberger, and Davey, placing each in historical context and within a
three-part jurisprudential matrix that illustrates significant shifts within
the Court's reading of the religion clauses. Readers will delight in
learning or recalling the great battles over polygamy, aid to religious
schools, compulsory education and free exercise, evolution, school
prayer, sacramental use of peyote, protection of religious speech on
college campuses, and scholarships for training for the ministry.
In Bezanson's stage one, the Court articulated and developed
adherence to a strict separationist theory (7-8); in stage two, Bezanson
finds a Court seeking new ways to read the religion clauses and to
accommodate the tension between the clauses (49-50); and finally in
stage three, Bezanson finds a radically different interpretation of the
religion clauses, a new awakening (147-49), perhaps the most
accommodationist view in history and the least protective of free
exercise claims.
Each story begins with an engrossing background on the parties:
who they were; where they came from; how each controversy arose. For
example, Bezanson follows George Reynolds, the lead plaintiff in one of
the most famous free exercise cases in American history, Reynolds v.
U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878), as a child in London, through his introduction
to the Mormon faith, his break with his family over his Mormonism, and
his journey across Europe and the United States, where he settled in Salt
Lake City as a clerk for Brigham Young. (10-12) Bezanson illustrates
how this important test case was arranged between the federal
authorities and officials of the Mormon Church and how Reynolds was
asked to step forward as the plaintiff. (12-15)
Too often, Supreme Court cases lose their human aspects and are
reduced to a simple rule or holding. Bezanson brings his cases to life.
The reader comes to know more of the life stories and characters of the
plaintiffs, their hopes and fears in becoming involved in controversial
religious liberty cases. Bezanson, for example, makes it clear that Susan
Epperson displayed enormous courage to become the test plaintiff in
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). She was a biology teacher in
Little Rock whose only goal was to teach her students biological
science. Yet Arkansas and other states had adopted a criminal provision
prohibiting teachers in state-supported schools from teaching "the theory
that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals," or
to use any textbook that taught Darwin's theory. (80-83)
Bezanson also situates each of his stories in historical context,
transporting the reader to the place and time of each decision. Thus,
beyond important biographical details on the parties, Bezanson informs

376

JOURNAL OFLAW & RELIGION

[Vol. XXVI

the reader of who was on the Court for each of the decisions, what was
happening politically within the Court and the nation, and what
circumstances precipitated the litigation. So the school prayer case,
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), is not just about the place of
religion in American life and the right of school officials to inculcate
moral values, it was about patriotism and anticommunism, as well as the
place of religion in public life. (103-05)
Bezanson is a gifted storyteller, making his book an excellent read.
And whether one is a novice or advanced student of the Court, every
reader will benefit from Bezanson's trenchant critiques of the players in
these historic controversies.
Like Sullivan's enlightened and searing analysis of the meaning of
religion, Bezanson also makes an important and fresh contribution. He
painstakingly dissects the oral arguments at the Supreme Court and the
leading opinions of the Court. In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia,

515 U.S. 819 (1995), for example, the reader meets Michael McConnell,
then a professor of law at the University of Chicago who represented
Ronald Rosenberger, and John Jeffries, of the University of Virginia
Law School, who represented the University, as well as the sharply
divided members of the Court. (189-90) Bezanson is a seasoned docent.
He does not overwhelm his readers or get in the way, but he does show
repeatedly the effective and ineffective arguments made by advocates
and how Court members press their own views of the issues.
Yet, Bezanson says his goal is not to make conclusions for his
readers, but rather to point out alternative ways of thinking about the
issues, rules, arguments and decisions. This book is immensely
readable, but it is not light. Like Sullivan's, it is a rich journey through
quite complicated questions. And, true to his goal, Bezanson raises
hundreds of questions, primarily about the Supreme Court advocates and
members of the Court.
Professor Patrick Garry's Wrestling with God is a direct attack on
the Supreme Court's tortuous interpretation of the religion clauses.
First, Garry asserts that the Court has construed the religion clauses to
conflict with each other; the Court has misread the establishment clause
too broadly and the free exercise clause too narrowly; and the Court has
given greater protection to free speech than religious liberty. (18-43)
Garry objects to the Court's conflation of religious liberty claims under
the speech clause, arguing, "As the framers recognized, religion is not
just speech. It is individual beliefs and life practices; it is forms of
worship and identity; it is communal association and support." (43)
Here, although Garry echoes Sullivan's critique, he goes much further to
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tell the reader how he thinks each religion clause should be read.
Garry's model of interpretation "would recognize that the two
religion clauses-exercise and establishment-are in fact two aspects of
a single, unified religion clause that seeks exclusively to protect
religious liberty." (12) For Garry, establishment is not a check on
religion or a guardian of secular society, but "a protection for the
institutional integrity of religious organizations (whereas the exercise
clause focuses on the protection of individual religious freedom)." (12)
Professor Garry is highly critical of most of the Court's
jurisprudence, especially its use of the wall of separation metaphor, as
well as its application of endorsement or neutrality tests. Garry implies
that the Court's various interpretive methodologies may "contribute to a
marginalization of religion in society." (44) He relies on Daniel
Dreisbach, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and Justice Arthur
Goldberg, among others, to argue that the Court has simply misread
Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists, which included the famous
line about a wall of separation between church and state. (45-52)
Although Garry concedes that, in establishment clause
jurisprudence, both the endorsement and neutrality tests were judicial
improvements over the religion-hostile Lemon test, neither is without
defects. The endorsement test "diverts the courts from the essential
focus of the establishment clause-state interference in the institutional
autonomy of religious organizations-and turns it instead to all the
possible perceptions of various religious expressions made on public
property." (68) Similarly, "the neutrality doctrine implies that religion is
neither distinct nor distinctly important, despite that [sic] fact that
religious liberty is the first freedom mentioned in the Bill of Rights."
(86) Garry insists that those who wrote the religion clauses intended
neither an overly broad establishment clause nor government neutrality
or indifference to religion. (86)
Professor Garry recalls significant historical examples from the
eighteenth or nineteenth century to argue that the Court has veered far
from the constitutional history and intent of the religion clauses. (87106) Here too, Garry asserts that the wall of separation metaphor
contradicts the relationship between religion and government in the
eighteenth century. (89-90) He illustrates that religious establishments
were extant through the middle of the nineteenth century, with the only
relevant tradition an "overwhelming agreement that government could
provide special assistance to religion in general, as long as such
assistance was given without preference among sects." (95) Rather than
follow constitutional history, Garry writes, "the Court used this wall of
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separation to institutionalize a growing social animosity to religion.
And in doing so, the Court inverted the status of religion." (106)
For Garry, in the media, in popular culture, in education, and in
other areas of American life, cultural elites have declared war on
religion-based morality. (108-27) He explains, "a crusade has evolved
to create a kind of civil religion out of a particular political agenda."
(126)
In his concluding chapters, Garry is the most ambitious. First, he
returns to his running critique of the establishment clause, arguing that it
protects religious institutions from unwanted governmental intrusion,
but was not intended to protect government or secular society. (145)
Again, Garry argues forcefully that the Court has overstated the
establishment clause, while understating the primary position of the free
exercise clause. (134-39)
Second, Garry re-affirms the case for
nonpreferential favoritism of religion and a theory of religious
accommodation. (158-64)
Garry's book will appeal greatly to readers seeking an unapologetic
defense of government support for religion. One weakness of the book
is that Garry does not always distinguish carefully between private
religious speech and government-sponsored religious activities. Another
drawback is that, although he wisely includes cases from different courts
around the country, he treats all cases, at all levels, as if they carry the
same weight.
Garry's book is a valuable read, even for observers like me who
disagree with many of his premises or interpretations. Although I do
agree with him that religion clause jurisprudence is incoherent and
under-protects religious liberty, we disagree on the particulars. Despite
the interesting read, I continue to think the religion clauses prohibit
government aid to institutions that teach religion. I cannot agree that the
framers sought only a nonpreferentialist policy. Garry's conclusion
seems inconsistent with both what Madison and Jefferson wrote and
accomplished in Virginia. Madison was clear that a true religion did not
need the aid of government.
In the end, I think Garry's book will resonate with a few members
of the Court, but I doubt that it will carry a majority of even the most
conservative justices. It is freighted with a provocative vision of how to
reconcile the religion clauses, but it is unclear why his more expansive
interpretation of free exercise is better than what he defines as a main
problem, namely the Court's expansive interpretation of the
Establishment Clause. I would be more convinced by an interpretation
that allows both clauses to have constitutional significance.
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Frank Ravitch's Masters of Illusion sounds a similar critical chord
to the other books by rejecting the Court's application of principles of
originalism and neutrality. (ix) His normative solution is a new
facilitation test: "government action that substantially facilitates or
discourages religion violates the establishment clause." (168) Ravitch's
challenge is to establish that yet another test will improve the Court's
religion clause jurisprudence in ways superior to prior tests.
Professor Ravitch begins with a simple assertion: "the use of
various narrow principles that ebb and flow based on context will lead to
more consistency and more interpretive transparency than reliance on
broad but illusory principles." (ix) In his view, "concepts such as
neutrality, liberty, and hostility are highly malleable, and they lend little
more than rhetorical justifications for decisions based on other
principles." (1) Specifically, Ravitch argues that neutrality and hard
originalism have no useful role in religion clause interpretation. (7)
Ravitch claims that since historical arguments over the framers'
intent in most cases cannot be resolved in favor of one side or the other
in religion clause interpretation debates, it would be much better to
abandon such illusory claims of interpretive objectivity. Instead, he
argues, judges choose historical accounts that best suit their goals in
particular cases. (4) Ravitch asks what the "underlying bases [are] for
choosing a given historical account and [whether] any of these bases
help obtain a better understanding and interpretation of the religion
clauses regardless of the historical accounts." (5)
Ravitch is equally suspicious of neutrality, arguing that it does not
exist in the religion clause context because such claims of neutrality
cannot be proven given that neutrality "is inherently dependent upon the
baseline one chooses to use in describing it, and thus it does not exist
apart from these baselines." (13) Ravitch asserts that calling a result
neutral may "obfuscate the nature and value of other principles that
undergird an argument, or may unnecessarily prop up those principles."
(20) Claims to formal or substantive neutrality then are misnomers.
"Since there is no neutral foundation or baseline that can be used to
prove that something is truly neutral, neutrality is nothing more than a
buzzword. . . ." (26) Ravitch reviews the Court's application of its
neutrality principle to several landmark decisions, including Zelman,
Good News and Smith, concluding that in each case the problem with
neutrality is that "One person's neutrality is another's discrimination or
favoritism, and if a court proclaims something to be neutral, there is no
way of proving the proclamation to be true." (28-29) An important
aspect of Ravitch's critique is that even where he agrees the Court
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reached the correct result, such as in the equal access cases like Good
News, he nonetheless takes issue with the Court's neutrality claims. (3032)
All four books, therefore, demonstrate the widespread
dissatisfaction with the Court's religion jurisprudence. What no author
appears accurately to envision, however, is what comes next. Each day
the nation becomes more religiously diverse. At the same time, the
Court appears unwilling to accommodate its diversity, and the
commentators offer little more. I await a Court that can protect all
citizens' religious freedom without favoring religion as the Court
currently does.

